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Are Imports from Rich Nations Deskilling Emerging Economies?




This paper starts by documenting that during the last decades, the human capital em-
bodied in imports from skill abundant nations has noticeably reduced skill accumulation in
the less developed world. To identify the causal relation between these variables, the analysis
utilizes over-time variation in the supply of skilled labor and the extent to which this variation
aﬀects the skill content of trade given the bilateral distance between im- and exporter. In a
panel estimation covering 41 non-OCED members, a one standard deviation higher geographic
pressure to import human capital is associated with a 12% reduction in the national average
length of schooling. The paper next develops a model to analyze the income and welfare
consequences of such trade-induced human capital disaccumulation. The model is based on
heterogeneous workers who make educational decisions in the presence of complete markets.
When heterogeneous workers invest in schooling, high type agents earn a surplus from their
investment. Trade shifts this surplus to rich countries that can use skills more eﬃciently. Con-
sequently, the dynamic eﬀects of liberalization tend to occur to initially rich countries, thus
leading to divergence.
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1 Introduction
Among economists and policymakers alike, there is agreement that import competition from low-
wage countries has caused a decline in the relative wage of unskilled workers in rich nations.1
Much less discussed is the ipside of this argument, namely that trade with richer nations tends
to depress the relative wage of skilled workers in less developed countries.
A straightforward implication of this factor price equalization is that trade reduces the incen-
tives to invest in human capital in less developed countries; i.e. trade with rich nations essentially
“deskills” emerging economies.2 How relevant is this argument empirically and are there impor-
tant welfare implications that policy makers should consider?
The rst part of this paper aims to quantify the causal eﬀect of trade on human capital in-
vestment decisions. I combine insights from the literature analyzing the factor content of trade
with the methodology developed by Frankel and Romer (1999), who isolate the geographic com-
ponent of trade to establish a causal relation between trade and growth. In particular, I isolate
the geographic component of imported skills, i.e. the human capital content other countries are
likely to export to a given nation conditional on its geographic location.
To address potential concerns with the Frankel and Romer methodology brought forward by
Rodrick et al. (2004) and Dollar and Kray (2003), I use panel estimations that control for country-
charachteristics and also over time variation in general geographic openness to trade; the empirical
specications thus exploit variation in how some countries tend to be relatively — compared to
their relative openness to all other goods — closer to supply of skilled labor and in how this relative
proximity to skilled labor varies throughout time.
It is shown that geographic proximity to skilled labor has both statistically and economi-
cally signicant eﬀects on domestic education decisions. For example, comparing two otherwise
identical nations, a one-standard deviation diﬀerence in geographic proximity to skilled labor is
associated with a 12% reduction in the national average length of schooling and a 15% reduction
in the national average length of higher education.
The second part of the paper analyzes the welfare and income consequences of trade-induced
(dis-)accumulation of human capital in a model featuring within-country worker heterogeneity
and across-country diﬀerences in the relative productivity of human capital.
The rst assumption of the model is that workers are heterogeneous in their relative ability
to provide skilled versus unskilled labor. Such worker heterogeneity has recently been shown to
1See the recent discussion in Krugman (2008), who reconsiders his earlier verdicts that such eﬀects are negligible.
Bernard et al. (2006) quantify the eﬀect of low wage import competition on employment, while Auer and Fischer
(2010) and Auer et al. (2010) estimate the price dynamics in sectors that are subject to a high degree of low-wage
import competition.
2The literature has extensively analyzed the case of trade-induced accumulation of physical capital, see foremost
Baldwin (1992). Stiglitz (1970) has used the factor price equalization insight to argue that complete specialization
is indeed unavoidable in a dynamic context. Ventura (1997) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2007), in turn, argue that
diﬀerences in factor abundance may be large (or even persist eternally) in an open world if countries specialize into
sectors with varying factor intensities.
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have important implications for within-country inequality and unemployment (see Helpman et al.
(2010a and b) and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010)). Here, I document that such within-country
heterogeneity also has important implications for the world distribution of income and welfare,
i.e. for across-country heterogeneity. The second assumption of the model is that countries diﬀer
in their level of human capital augmenting technology. The latter assumption is based on the
ndings of Caselli and Coleman (2006), who provide evidence that while the productivity of
unskilled labor is similar across the world, there are huge diﬀerences in the eﬃciency with which
diﬀerent nations use skilled labor.3
Together, these two assumptions imply that liberalization is associated with divergence of the
world distribution of income because it shifts educational investment to already skill abundant
(and thus rich) nations. At the moment of trade liberalization, educational investment diverges.
Since educational investments take the form of forgone earnings, the dynamic path of income is
rst characterized by a phase of convergence during which poor countries send a smaller fraction
of young workers to the educational sector,4 while their older cohorts are still relatively skilled.
Richer countries start sending a larger fraction of young workers into schooling, while their supply
of skilled labor is stable for a while. The resulting medium term response of income to liberal-
ization thus displays absolute convergence of income levels. This pattern prevails until the rst
cohort of workers who started schooling at the moment of opening markets to trade enters the
labor force. From then on, earlier changes in educational investment start to pay oﬀ and the GDP
of rich countries increases, while the opposite is true in poor countries. The resulting long term
dispersion of income is larger than at the moment of opening to trade.
The model also shows that due to the underlying worker heterogeneity, the dynamic gains from
trade may favor already rich nations: when heterogeneous workers invest in schooling, higher type
workers make a surplus from their investment. A trade-induced higher relative wage increases the
expected lifetime income for the workers who already would have chosen schooling in the autarky
economy. In addition, an increase in the relative wage induces more entry into the skilled labor
force. In total, the net return from education — taking into consideration the opportunity cost of
forgone unskilled labor — responds more than proportionally to changes in the relative wage. Skill
scarce nations, in contrast, have their comparative advantage in labor, a factor that is in xed
supply and cannot be accumulated. Thus, trade may create divergence of welfare since richer
nations gain proportionally the most from liberalization.5
3In fact, Caselli and Coleman even argue that such diﬀerences in human capital augmenting technology can
account for a substantial part of the variation in the world income distribution.
4The mechanism at work is similar to the one in Galor and Mountford (2006), who - in a Malthusian setting -
analyze how trade can inuence population growth and therefore result in an less educated workforce in initially
poor countries.
5It is noteworthy that the model does not feature any externalities such as monopolistic competition or matching
imperfections in the labor market. Rather, it is the nature of the worker heterogeneity itself that causes the gains
from trade to be distributed asymmetrically across rich and poor countries. This documents an important diﬀerence
in the welfare eﬀects of human as opposed to physical capital accumulation. Baldwin (1992) establishes that trade-
induced capital accumulation has no welfare consequences in the absence of externalities. His main insight is simple:
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The last part of the model evaluates the general equilibrium response of simultaneously opening
many countries to trade. In the model, since trade equates good prices across the world, the
dynamic response of education decisions tends to concentrate human capital in countries that can
use skills eﬃciently. With open markets, the typical skilled worker thus works in a country with
a higher level of human capital augmenting technology than in the closed economy. Thus, trade
increases the relative output of skill intensive goods, i.e. trade liberalization creates skill bias.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical analysis. Section
3 describes a model featuring heterogeneous and nitely lived workers investing in their human
capital. Section 4 characterizes the resulting autarky equilibrium. Section 5 establishes the path
of income as well as the welfare eﬀects of opening a small economy to trade. Section 6 endogenizes
world prices and establishes the skill bias of world trade. Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
This section presents evidence that the skill content of imports has sizeable eﬀects on domestic
education decisions and human capital levels. The methodology I propose has two steps. In the
rst step, I isolate the geographic component of the factor content of trade. The variable - termed
“geographic proximity to skilled labor” is obtained by running gravity style regressions on the
factor content of imports and then isolating the geographical component of the skill content of
imports in a way following Frankel and Romer (1999). Doing so, I tackle the following problem:
even in a static world with xed supply of skilled and unskilled labor, any measure of the factor
content of trade would be correlated with domestic education levels. To deal with this endogeneity,
I only use the information of a country’s geographic proximity to international supply of skilled
and unskilled labor to instrument for the observed factor content of trade. In this way, I isolate
the component of international trade that is not stemming from domestic supply and demand,
but exclusively from the factor supply of other nations.
Frankel and Romer construct measures of how much other nations are likely to export to a
given nation conditional on the geographic bilateral distance to establish a causal relation between
trade and growth. Similarly, the measures constructed in this paper reect how much skilled labor
content other countries are likely to export to a given nation. I subsequently test whether this
measure of geographic proximity to skilled and unskilled labor has signicant eﬀects on domestic
education decisions and the stock of human capital.
In the second step, I use the constructed measures of “geographic proximity to skilled labor”
to identify whether trade aﬀects human capital decisions. The strategy I adopt tackles two key
critiques. A rst potential problem is that the geographic instrument for trade is collinear with
since the marginal cost of accumulating capital is constant and in equilibrium, the return to capital equals the cost of
accumulation, investors do not record a net gain from the additional accumulated capital (as the envelope theorem
would predict). The latter is diﬀerent for the case of human capital accumulation, since the education decision is
private and some workers may well earn a net surplus from their educational investment.
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country-specic determinants of development such as institutional quality (see, in particular the
critiques by Rodrick et al. (2004) and Dollar and Kray (2003)). This issue is tackled following
the methodology of Dollar and Kray (2003): I do not rely on the cross-sectional information as in
Frankel and Romer’s original analysis, but rather use the time-series variation. A second problem
is that countries that are close to supply of skilled labor also tend to be geographically open to
trade in general. I thus also include a country’s general level of geographic openness to trade —
again varying over time — in all specications. Overall, the strategy thus exploits variation in how
some countries tend to be relatively — compared to their relative openness to all goods — closer to
supply of skilled labor and in how this relative proximity to skilled labor varies throughout time.
In a panel spanning the years 1972 to 1992 in 41 non-OECD nations, I nd that proximity
to skilled labor has a detrimental eﬀect on domestic human capital accumulation. For example, I
nd that a one standard deviation diﬀerence in geographic proximity to skilled labor is associated
with a roughly 12% diﬀerence in overall education.
2.1 Factor Supply and Bilateral Trade: Constructing the Instrument
In a rst step, I use bilateral trade ow data from Feenstra et al. (1997) and the US productivity
matrix (obtained from Antweiler and Treer (2002)) to translate 3-digit industry level trade ows
into the net factor content of trade. I then use factor endowment data from Antweiler and Treer
to relate domestic factor endowments to the factor content of trade. The data of Antweiler and
Treer is available for 5 periods (1972, 77, 82, 87, and 92) and 63 countries.
Let    index importing countries and let    −1 index countries of origin, let    index
factors and let    index industries. Let  be the () matrix summarizing international factor
endowments, so that  denotes the endowment of factor  in country . Let ∗ be the ()
unit requirement matrix that is common to all countries once factor augmenting productivity
diﬀerences are taken into account.6 Finally, let  be the () vector of good imports from
country  to country . A country’s imports can be converted into the factor content by applying
the unit requirement matrix. I denote the factor content of bilateral imports from country  to
country  by , which is given by
 = ∗ ×  (1)
Testing the original Hecksher-Ohlin-Vaneck (HOV) hypothesis would boil down to testing whether
the net vector of the factor content of trade (i.e. imports to country  minus exports from country
) equals the national endowment minus a constant share  of world endowment for each factor.
6Antweiler and Treer (2002) also allow for country-specic factor augmenting productivity diﬀerences, obtained
from factor prices. However, lack of precise wage data leads them to uniformly adjust for all types of labor rather
than for skilled and unskilled worker productivity separately. The t of my model that focuses on relative levels of











This pure HOV prediction has received mixed support in the theory (albeit some when adjusting
for factor augmenting technology, see Treer (1995)). Research has, however, been more successful
in showing that bilateral trade ows follow the direction implied by Hecksher Ohlin trade theory
quite closely. This arguably weaker prediction receives strong support in several studies (see
Debaere (2003) and Choi and Krishna (2004)) and it also has received a theoretical underpinning
by Romalis (2004).
Romalis establishes that the predictions of HOV theory hold qualitatively in the context
of Krugman’s (1980) model of monopolistic competition and transport costs. The tests of the
bilateral factor content of trade and the ndings of Romalis are the starting point for the empirical
section of this paper: rather than testing (2), I relate the factor content of bilateral trade (1) to
the relative abundance of factors at home and abroad. The weakest test is whether the relative











Where  and  measure the skilled and unskilled labor content of
trade, while  and  measure the abundance of these two factors in the importing
and exporting nation.
Column (1) of Table 1 estimates equation (3) with 2 restricted to 0, i.e. only considering the
relative supply of skilled labor in the exporting country. The coeﬃcient is signicantly positive,
implying that more skill abundant countries tend to export more skill intensive goods and hence
have a larger relative skilled factor content of exports compared to the unskilled factor content of
trade. The coeﬃcient equals 0051, implying that raising a country’s fraction of skilled workers
by 10 percentage points increases the skill intensity of its export by 051 percentage points.
Column (2) instead restricts 1 to equal 0, i.e. it only estimates the eﬀect of domestic skill
supply on the composition of imports. Countries that are more skill abundant, on average, tend
to import relatively fewer skill intensive goods and hence have a lower relative import skill labor
content. The coeﬃcient is equal to −0036 implying that raising a country’s fraction of skilled
workers by 10 percentage points decreases the skill intensity of its imports by 036 percentage
points. Column (3) conrms these patterns when both foreign’s and home’s skill abundance are
included: countries that are skill abundant import less skill intensive goods and export more skill
intensive goods. These patterns are again conrmed when using a diﬀerent denition of the skill
intensity of imports, namely the ratio of the population with at least some secondary education
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in Columns (4) to (6).
Relative endowment diﬀerences have signicant eﬀects on the relative factor content of imports
and exports. I next nest this nding in an otherwise standard gravity framework to predict the
skill of trade and isolate its geographic component. The specications in Table 2 relate the factor
content of bilateral imports to geographical distance, country size (measured by population or
factor abundance). With the Frankel and Romer (1999) identication strategy in mind, I do not
include any information on the importing nation other than its population size in the regression.
I next present gravity-style estimations that relate importer information, exporter information,
and bilateral distance to the bilateral factor content of trade:
 =  [ + 1 () + 2 () + 3 () + ] (4)
Table 2 describes the results from estimating these gravity-style equations Poisson specications7
of the form of Equation (4). In columns (1) to (4) the dependent variable is the skilled labor
content of trade measured in number of workers with nished high school education. Column
(1) estimates model (4) using trade and endowment data from 1992. The independent variables
include distance, the logarithm of the population in the exporting and the importing country, and
the relative skill abundance in the exporting nation. A country that has a 1% more skilled labor
force (keeping the population constant) on average exports 3.25% more skilled labor content. As
expected, distance between two nations decreases trade ows and therefore also the embodied
factor content. Secondly, the size of the importing market, as captured by the population in
the importing nation increases trade volume, but with an elasticity of less than 1, implying that
bigger nations tend to trade less in percentage terms of their GDP.
In the remainder of Table 2, instead of looking at the exporter skill supply in relative terms,
I add the logarithm of the total supply of skilled labor, again measured in the number of workers
with nished high school education. The coeﬃcient is estimated at 076, implying that a 1%
higher supply of skilled labor in the exporting country is associated with a 076% higher skilled
labor content of trade (the elasticity is smaller than 1 since larger countries trade less on average).
When constructing the measure of proximity to skills below, I run gravity equation such as the
one presented in Column (2) separately for each of the ve time periods. Against this backdrop,
it is interesting to see whether the nature of how distance has shaped trade ows has changed of
time. Column (3) repeats the specication of Column (2) for the year 1972 instead of 1992. The
distance coeﬃcient is again estimated at 0655 and also the other coeﬃcients remain remarkably
stable throughout time. Thus, the over time variation in the measures constructed below derives
from the over time variation of skill supply in diﬀerent regions of the world rather than variation
in how geography aﬀects trade ows.
There may be other reasons in addition to the supply of skills that lead certain countries
7I use the estimation command suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The results presented below are robust
to using alternative specications of the gravity estimation such as the ones of Helpman et al. (2006).
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to export more or less skilled labor, most notably the skill supply of countries neighboring the
exporter (which could be termed "multilateral resistance to skilled labor " following Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003)). Column (4) thus adds exporter xed eﬀects. Since the estimation is
for 1992 only, the variable foreign supply of skilled workers drops out of the specication. The
coeﬃcient of distance and the coeﬃcient of home’s population remain relatively unchanged.
Specications (5) and (6) use a diﬀerent variable to measure the skill supply in Foreign. In
(5), the skilled labor content of trade is measured by the number of workers with at least some
secondary education in the exporting nation. The dependent variable in this specication is the
logarithm of the supply of workers with at least some secondary education. In (6) the skilled
labor content of trade is measured by the number of workers with at least some tertiary education
and the dependent variable is the number of workers with at least some tertiary education in the
exporting nation. Finally, in the last two specications of Table 1, I document that the proposed
methodology can also predict the capital and land content of trade.
In accordance with the results of David and Weinstein (2001), factor endowments correlate
strongly and in the right order of magnitude (elasticities estimated below 1, but not by much)
with the observed factor content of trade. I now predict equation (4) of Table 2 with exporter
xed eﬀects to end up with a variable _, where  stands for the "Geographic
Factor Content of Trade" and  measures the number of worker with nished high school
or equivalent. _ thus corresponds to a country’s geographical proximity to skilled
labor. For example, a value of 001 means that given the geographic location of this country, on
average the skilled worker content of trade is equal to 001 per head of the population.
In similar fashion, I predict _, the geographic element of the no-highschool
workers content of trade, _ the geographic element of the "at least some primary
education"-worker content of trade, _ the geographic element of the "at least some
secondary education"-workers content of trade, _ the geographic element of the
no-education workers content of trade, _ the geographic element of "at least some
tertiary"-workers content of trade, _ the geographic element of capital content of
trade, _ the geographic element of the land content of trade. It is noteworthy that
for each of these variables, I run and predict a separate specication for each of the 5 time periods,
hence resulting in time varying measures.
I standardize all resulting measures so that the coeﬃcients below can easily be interpreted. I
end up with estimates for 63 countries (of which 41 are non-OCED members) that are listed in
Table 6 of Appendix C.
2.2 Imported Human Capital and Domestic Education
I next use the constructed measures of “geographic proximity to skilled labor” to identify whether
trade aﬀects human capital decisions. These variables are estimated for each of the 5 time periods
separately, thus allowing to analyze the over time variation of the instrument.
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The structure of Table 3 is the following. Columns (1) to (4) serve to highlight the methodology
used to identify the causal eﬀect of imported skills on domestic education. Column (5) then
presents the main specication. To make sure that none of the results are driven by the underlying
upward trends of both trade and education, all specications include a trend.
Column (1) in Table 3 displays a random eﬀects model with 41 non-OECD countries and 5
5-year intervals from 1972 to 1992. The only regressor is _, the geographic skill
content of trade measured by workers with nished high school education or equivalent. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of total average years of education in the workforce over 15
years of age. The coeﬃcient is estimated at −008 and is statistically highly signicant. It is also
economically very large: a one standard deviation diﬀerence in geographic proximity to skilled
labor is associated with a 8% diﬀerence in education levels.
A potential problem with the specication in Column (1) is that countries close to supply of
skilled labor also tend to be geographically open to trade in general. Column (2) thus adds a
country’s general level of geographic openness to trade — taken from Frankel and Romer — to the
estimation. While the eﬀect of geographic openness on education itself is positive, the eﬀect of
proximity to skilled workers is negative, with the coeﬃcient now even being estimated at −01.
A second potential problem is tackled in Columns (3) and (4): the geographic measure for
trade constructed in the section above is collinear with other country-specic determinants of
development such as institutional quality (see, in particular the critiques by Rodrick et al. (2004)
and by Dollar and Kray (2003)). Column (3) thus adds settler mortality from Acemoglu et al.
(2001) and legal origin dummies (from La Porta et al. (1998), coeﬃcients not displayed) to
control for the historical determinants of institutions. Addition of these controls does not seem to
aﬀect the coeﬃcients by much, but there might be potentially other country-specic determinants
of development that are collinear with _. To address all such concerns, Column
(4) follows the methodology of Dollar and Kray (2003) and adds country-xed eﬀects. The
specication thus does not rely on the cross-sectional information as in Frankel and Romer’s
original analysis, but rather, the time-series variation.
Dollar and Kray (2003) construct a time-varying version of the Frankel and Romer instrument
for trade. To address the concern that the over time variation of _ might be collinear
with the time-varying general openness to trade, I thus also include a time-varying measure of
geographic openness to trade in addition to the time-varying measure of geographic proximity to
skilled labor.
The resulting main specication in Column (5) thus includes a trend and xed eﬀects, and
two time-varying measures of geographic openness (in general to trade and to importing skilled
labor). Overall, Column 5 thus exploits variation in how some countries tend — compared to their
relative openness to all goods — be relatively close to supply of skilled labor and how this relative
proximity to skilled labor varies throughout time.
I nd that the coeﬃcients of proximity to skilled labor is statistically highly signicant and is
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also very large in economic terms: holding country, time, and general openness to trade constant,
a one-standard deviation diﬀerence in geographic proximity to skilled labor is associated with a
12% diﬀerence in education levels. This is economically very sizeable and also comparable to the
eﬀect of geographic openness itself (positive coeﬃcient 0191, also this variable is standardized).
Columns (6) and (7) further investigate the time dimension of proximity to skills and domestic
education: human capital decisions tend to be made at the beginning of one’s life, and geographic
proximity to skilled labor should thus have a slow but long-lasting eﬀect on human capital levels.
Column (6) adds the 5 year lag of proximity to skilled workers to the specication, which also
aﬀects the level of education, but to a weaker extent. Column (7) relates 5-year changes in
_ to 5-year changes in a country’s average education levels. The order of economic
magnitude is comparable to the level regressions: a change of proximity to skills by one standard
deviation is associated with a 10% change in the rate of skill accumulation.
Table 3 documents that being geographically close to countries with a high high school com-
pletion rate decreases overall education in the importing country. I next investigate which type
of education is aﬀected the most by such proximity and also, if diﬀerent types of education react
diﬀerently to diﬀerent types of imported skills.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 reproduce the main specication of Column 5 in Table 3 for
two alternative dependent variables. Both estimations include country xed eﬀects, a trend, and
time-varying measures of general trade openness as well as of proximity to workers with nished
high school (_). In specication (1), the dependent variable is the logarithm of
average years of primary education in the workforce. In specication (2), the dependent variable
is the logarithm of average years of higher (secondary plus tertiary) education in the workforce.
While the eﬀect of _ is signicant for both types of education, the coeﬃcient is
larger for advanced education: a one-standard deviation diﬀerence in proximity to skilled labor
is associated with a 15% reduction of advanced education, but only a 10% reduction in primary
education.
Columns (3) and (4) evaluate the ip side of the results presented above: does proximity to
unskilled labor increase domestic education? The dependent variables are again the logarithm of
primary (in Column (3)) and the logarithm of higher education (in Column (4)). Both primary
education and higher education signicantly increase if a country is closer to supply of unskilled
labor. Again, I nd that this relation is more pronounced for advanced education than for primary
education.
Columns (5) and (6) estimate the response to proximity of highly skilled workers. A highly
skilled worker is dened as having either at least some secondary or at least some tertiary educa-
tion. Also for this independent variable, I nd that both primary education and higher education
are negatively aﬀected by proximity to highly skilled workers, with the eﬀect being stronger for
higher education.
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3 A Model of Heterogenous Workers
I next develop a model analyzing the welfare eﬀects of trade-induced human capital accumulation.
The framework of this paper draws on the insights of Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), who propose
a general equilibrium model of human capital accumulation in the presence of international trade.
I depart from their model with two key assumptions. In my framework, countries are characterized
by exogenously given diﬀerences of the eﬃciency of human capital (for empirical evidence see
Caselli and Coleman (2005) and also Treer (1995)).
A second departure from Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) is that I assume that, while workers
are homogenous in how well they can provide unskilled labor, they diﬀer in how well they can
supply skilled labor if they chose to get an education. In the resulting equilibrium of the economy,
low type workers do not accumulate skills. Higher type workers do, and while there may exist a
cut-oﬀ type that is indiﬀerent between getting an education or not, all other skilled workers earn
a surplus from education. Trade induced changes in relative wages aﬀect this surplus in a way
that favors already rich and developed nations, leading to divergence of welfare.8
3.1 Preferences, Production Relations and Demography
This section describes the economic environment. The model is formulated in continuous time,
which is indexed by  ( ≥ 0). The world economy consists of many small countries that are
indexed by . Each country  has mass 1 of identically and innitely lived households. Each
household is composed of a mass of heterogeneous and nitely lived workers. I describe the
formation of skills below. Households make the education decisions for workers and have stable






I assume that  is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with
0(0) = ∞. Innite marginal utility at  = 0 is assumed for convenience so that the economy
is never on a path where investment is equal to zero for all times. A standard budget constraint
applies, which restricts the net present cost of the path of consumption being at most as big as the
net present value of future income. Let  denote a country’s production. The budget constraint










  +  (6)
8This characteristic of the model is what makes human capital diﬀerent from physical capital. Baldwin (1992)
discusses the dynamic gains from trade when physical capital is accumulated endogenously. He concludes that in
the absence of externalities, trade induced accumulation has no welfare consequences.
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The interest rate  is not country specic, i.e. well developed global capital markets exist. 
denotes the net asset position of country .9
Final output  is dened over a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of a skill
intensive and a labor intensive good. Denoting the amount of the labor intensive intermediate
good used in production by  and the amount of the human capital intensive good by ,










The nal good is produced competitively. The elasticity of substitution between the two inter-
mediate goods is constant and equal to (1 − )
−1. Throughout the analysis, I assume that the
intermediate goods are gross substitutes.
Assumption 1. 0    1
Assumption 1 implies that price eﬀects are not very strong so that in equilibrium, a human
capital abundant economy is characterized by a low price of skill intensive goods but still larger
total expenditures on skill intensive goods than in a labor abundant economy. Autor et al. (1998)
have estimated the elasticity between skilled and unskilled labor directly. They conclude that it
is unlikely to fall outside the interval [12], which in this model corresponds to 0    05. I
denote the prices of the two intermediate goods in country  by  and . Normalizing the








 = 1, i.e. the relative price diﬀers across
countries when there is no international trade.
The two intermediate goods are produced from two factors, human capital and "raw" un-
skilled labor. Human capital  can be used to produce the skill intensive good using a linear
transformation technology. Labor  can be used to produce the labor intensive good using a lin-
ear transformation technology. I sometimes refer to these two goods as the skill intensive sector
and the labor intensive sector respectively. While raw labor can be used equally eﬃciently in all
countries, I assume that the eﬀectiveness of human capital depends on some exogenously given,
country-specic parameter  that is stable over time.11
I denote the output of the skill intensive good in country  by  and the output of the labor
intensive good by .
 =  and  =  (8)
The two intermediate goods are produced competitively. There are no factors of production other
than human capital and labor. Equation (8) incorporates the simplication that production in
9This implies that nal output can always be traded so that countries can borrow, lend, and repay to each other.
10For simplicity, (7) omits the distribution parameters normally present in the CES production function.
11These cross-country diﬀerences in  can be seen as stemming from diﬀerences in the institutional setup of a
country, see Caselli and Coleman (2005). Appendix B endogenizes the level of technology.
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each sector requires either only unskilled labor or only human capital. A generalization of the
model at hand with both goods requiring both factors but at diﬀerent intensities would not
change the results as long as countries have similar enough factor supplies such that factor price
equalization holds in the open economy equilibrium.
I now turn to the supply of skilled and unskilled labor. Each household consists of a mass of
heterogeneous and nitely lived workers. Per household and unit of time, a mass of  workers is
born. Young workers are of type  and can spend time educating themselves. If they choose to
get an education, they enter the labor force after a xed period of time  and start supplying one
unit of unskilled labor and  units of skilled labor. Workers that do not get an education supply
one unit of unskilled labor from their moment of birth. For each type  and at each moment of
time, households decide whether the worker does get an education or not. Let () denote
the education decision for a worker of type  in country  at time . () equals 1 if the worker
gets an education and 0 otherwise. There is no cost of education other than time spent in school.
Also, there is no utility from getting an education or working. After entering the labor force, all
agents face a constant and age-independent rate of death . This convenient structure of the life
cycle ensures that the size of a country’s working population and the demographic composition
are constant along any stationary equilibrium.
Types are distributed equally in all households and countries with a Pareto density function
with shape parameter (1 − )
−1 and scale parameter .





The parameter restrictions 0    1 and 0   as well as the lower bound of  ≤  apply. A
lower  is associated with more heterogeneous workers. The scale parameter in (9) is chosen such
that  does not aﬀect the average type and it is always true that  () = . With this formulation,
a decrease of  is a mean preserving spread of the distribution of types.
Since all workers are perfectly substitutable the total supply of human capital is given by the
sum over past education decisions adjusted for types, the probability of survival, and whether a








where Υ denotes the indicator function that equals 1 if a worker has left school and 0 otherwise.
Since education is restricted to take place at the beginning of an individuals’ life, Υ takes the
value 1 whenever  ≤  − . Similarly, the supply of labor takes into consideration that some
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Supply of services from labor  comes from two groups: unskilled workers and skilled workers
who have nished their education.
4 Autarky Wage Patterns
This section establishes the equilibrium in a closed economy. Before solving for the stationary
equilibrium path of the economy in autarky, I establish the instantaneous competitive equilibrium.
Thereafter, I establish a stationary equilibrium and explain the origin of income and consumption
diﬀerences in autarky.
Denition 1 A feasible autarky allocation in country  given the supply of labor (11) and the
supply of human capital (10), consists of functions [()] that satisfy (8) and (6)
such the integral over (5) is nite and well dened. A resource constraint restricting input use in
(7) to  ≤  and  ≤  applies.
At each point in time , there are perfectly competitive spot markets for the two intermediates
and the nal good. Non-satiation of the instantaneous utility together with the strictly positive
marginal product of inputs in (7) ensures that all inequalities hold. I rst establish the instan-
taneous equilibrium given factor supplies. For simplicity, I drop time subscripts  unless there
is danger of confusion. I denote the wage of raw labor by , the factor return of one unit of
human capital by  and the relative wage by  ≡

 . Prot maximization by competitive
nal goods producers (7) relates the relative price of intermediate goods to relative input use.










Intermediate goods are produced using a linear transformation technology and (12) also deter-









The relative wage is increasing in the eﬃciency of technology but decreasing in the relative abun-
dance of human capital. Since the price of the nal good is normalized to 1, the relative price 
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alone pins down  and  and consequently also wages.
Each household chooses the education taking the actions of other households in the economy
as given. A strategy for a household is a subset of each cohort of workers that are sent to the
educational sector and the intertemporal consumption decision. I evaluate rst the education
decision () of each household. Since there exist perfect capital markets, each household
maximizes the net present ow of labor income from each worker. Denote by  () the net
present value of the lifetime income that a worker of type  born at  in country  receives when
the education decision is (). Income is discounted to the point of birth  of the respective














 +() if () = 1
(14)
The eﬀective cost of education is giving up the unskilled wage from time  to +. The benet is
the additional income equal to  times the skilled wage from time + on. Along any path of the
economy, (14) leads to threshold for the worker type and the education decision of a household:
if it is optimal for a household to choose () = 1, then the same is true for any other type
0  . Therefore, there exists a cutoﬀ level  such that all types  ≥  get an education
and all other types do not. The main sections of the paper are concerned with across-countries
comparison of the aggregate gains from trade. I therefore dene the aggregate net present income
from the current cohort of workers . Total income is equal to the integration of the maximal
income (14) over types. This denes the discounted ow of income from the current generation







There is no aggregate uncertainty in this economy. Given (15) for past, present and future
generations, the household has a separate consumption decision. Optimization of intertemporal
utility (5) subject to (6) yields a familiar result for the slope of the consumption process.
Denition 2 A competitive static equilibrium, given by the initial stock of human capital (10),
labor (11) and  consists of a feasible allocation of functions for [() ()()()]
such that (12) and (13) hold, () maximizes lifetime income for all cohorts (15) and the
path of consumption maximizes (5) subject to (6).
I next consider the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium (SE) in autarky. Let
an "" superscript denote expressions along such a stationary equilibrium, in which the relative
price is constant and equal to 
 , the relative wage is a function of  and  and the interest rate
is stable. Households choose a cutoﬀ level 

 and, since there is no technological progress, output
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and consumption are constant. Convergence to a stationary equilibrium is established easily
because investment and intertemporal consumption decisions are independent. First, evaluate
the cutoﬀ condition (16) along any path of development. A single household has no inuence on
the relative wages or interest rates. Even if is optimal to school all types of workers, there is still
a well dened and nite supply of unskilled and skilled labor for any path of wages and interest
rates that leads to a nite net discounted value of income. Arbitrage considerations ensure a
non-negative rate of interest at all moments of time. A nonzero interest rate combined with a
positive rate of death  implies that the discounted value of income is nite for any worker. Hence
intertemporal income of a household is always dened. By standard arguments, time separable
and concave preferences combined with a constant rate of time preference lead to a constant
interest rate of  =  along any path where income is stable. If   0, a unique and stable
stationary equilibrium exists in which the choice of the cutoﬀ point is a constant function of the
interest rate and the autarky wages 
 and 
. Evaluating the entry condition (14) at the
worker of type  = 












Given the optimal choice of 

 , one can solve for the maximal net present value of income from
the present cohort of workers, which if given by (15) in autarky. Along any path of the economy
with constant wages and cutoﬀ level , I denote the net present value of income from the current




. Without assuming any specic distribution of types, it is
always possible to express the net present income of a cohort of workers depending exclusively on
the two wages. Evaluated at 

 , the total income discounted to the point of birth of a generation


























For any relative wage  =

 , income is at least equal to 
+. There are  young workers
who could start working right away and earn the unskilled wage forever, where the future is
discounted at rate  +  to account for the probability of death. Secondly, for any   0,
there may exist high type agents that nd it worthy to get an education. The marginal worker
of type  = 

 just breaks even on his educational investment, but for all workers of higher type
, the possibility to get educated increases their lifetime income. It is important to note that the
aggregate surplus from having access to an education, which is represented by the second term in
(17), is more than proportionally increasing in the relative wage : if the relative wage increases,
there are two margins in which net income from education is aﬀected. The increased relative
wage benets all worker proportionally that would have chosen to get educated at lower wages.
In addition, if the relative wage increases, the optimal cutoﬀ level 

 decreases, hence beneting
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the additional entrants (weakly). An increase of the relative wage - given the unskilled wage
- hence results in a more than proportional increase in the net income from education. In the
case of no heterogeneity of workers (this corresponds to  → 1 in the specic case of the Pareto
distribution (9)) there is no surplus from education. In this case, the model becomes very similar
to that of Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) and all workers earn the unskilled wage (19). Intrinsic
across-country diﬀerences in  hence do no longer matter because diﬀerent workers earn diﬀerent
wages, but exclusively through general equilibrium eﬀects that inuence the unskilled wage.
I now solve for general equilibrium prices, wages and level of income (17) in the case of the
Pareto distribution of types (9). In the autarky stationary equilibrium the only source of across-
country variation is . Solving the supply of labor (11) and human capital (10) for the constant
cutoﬀ 

 , factor supply is given by 
















1−. In equilibrium, the higher a country’s relative eﬃciency of
human capital , the more skill abundant is this country. With the supply of factors given, prices
(12) and consequently wages (13) are determined uniquely. In autarky, skill abundant countries
have a lower relative price of the skill intensive good, but still a higher relative wage.
The relative abundance of factors, technology and the normalization of the nal good price to
1 relate the equilibrium unskilled wage 












A country that is characterized by a high  has a low autarky price of the skill intensive good.
Because the normalization of the nal good relates relative and absolute prices one to one, the
price of the labor intensive good is high in these countries. Since each unit of raw labor can























In equilibrium, a country that is characterized by a high eﬃciency of human capital has a high
level of net income (20), i.e. it is "rich". The stationary net present income (15) of young cohort





















High eﬃciency countries have a high level of net income and are rich. Because of the convenient
Pareto distribution of types, the net income from human capital is equal to a fraction − (1 − )
of the total income from skilled labor services.
How does the heterogeneity of workers inuence the lifetime income of a cohort of workers?
Consider rst the case of homogenous types ( → 1), in which all workers earn 
. The model
then becomes very similar to that of Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983). All workers earn the
unskilled wage (19) and technology diﬀerences matter only through relative supply and price
eﬀects: a country with high  is characterized by a high supply of human capital and hence a
lower price of the skill intensive good. A low price of the skill intensive good implies a high price
of the labor intensive good and consequently a high unskilled wage. Consider now the case of a
decrease in , i.e. a mean preserving spread of the distribution of types. In autarky equilibrium a
low  is associated with a large share of surplus as a fraction of total revenue of the skill intensive
sector.12
More important than the eﬀects  has on absolute levels of income and output is the impact
it has on relative across-country diﬀerences. Nations intrinsically only diﬀer with respect to
their level of human capital augmenting technology . The heterogeneity of workers guides how
diﬀerences in technology translate into diﬀerences of income and factor abundance. If types are
similar, small diﬀerences in human capital eﬃciency translate into large diﬀerences of relative
factor abundance and income. If the degree of workers heterogeneity is large, diﬀerences in 
translate into only moderate diﬀerences of factor endowment: the more spread the distribution
of types is, the lower is the density of workers at any point along the distribution  (). For a
given intrinsic diﬀerence in  and therefore in the relative demand for factors and in the cutoﬀ
point , the resulting international dispersion of relative factor supply is large if the distribution
of workers is homogenous.
Cross-country diﬀerences are inuenced by the elasticity of substitution between skill- and
labor intensive intermediate goods. Consider rst the case of  bigger than, but close to 0.
In this case, price eﬀects in (7) are oﬀsetting diﬀerences in technology and countries have nearly
identical factor supplies. Countries thus only diﬀer in their level of technology and hence output.13
A higher beta is associated with weaker price eﬀects and thus increasingly pronounced across-
country diﬀerences in autarky factor supply. In the case of  = 1 the production of the nal
good (7) is linear in inputs used, relative input prices are xed and therefore international factor
abundance levels are very diﬀerent. The level of  also determines the size of gains from trade,
which are derived in the next section.
12For given wages and therefore cutoﬀ level , the supply of skilled workers (10) is lower if types are more
heterogeneous. Although the expected value of the distribution of types is unaﬀected by , the truncated expected
value (that is the expected value given that the type is higher than ) actually increases with . This eﬀect is
captured in the value of .
13In the case of  = 0, (7) takes the Cobb Douglas shape with expenditure share of 12 for each sector. As is





5 Trade and the Evolution of Income and Welfare
Trade leads nations with a comparatively high level of human capital eﬃciency to specialize in
skill intensive goods and leads to other nations providing unskilled labor services. In a dynamic
context, the basic asymmetry of the model is that trade induces productive nations to specialize
in a factor that can be accumulated, which increases the growth potential of the economy. Less
productive nations specialize in ’raw’ labor, a factor in xed supply. Opening markets to trade
therefore results in divergence of the world distribution of income.
A great deal of literature debates the gains from trade for poor nations. Young (1991) shows
how trade can cause countries to specialize in industries with diﬀerential learning-by-doing po-
tential and hence be on diﬀerent dynamic learning paths. Countries with low initial experience
in industrial production specialize in sectors with low learning potential and may thus loose from
trade. Krugman and Venables (1995) show how, in the presence of increasing returns, initial
patterns of specialization tend to reinforce themselves because new rms locate close to exist-
ing industry. Other contributions, not limited to, but including Matsuyama (1991) and the new
economic geography literature originating from Krugman (1991), focus on similar mechanisms of
increasing returns.
The model developed here diﬀers substantially from the existing literature on the dynamic
gains from trade because it does not focus on the evolution of location and productivity of diﬀerent
industries but rather on the endogenous formation of factor supplies. The notion that exchange
- if it happens - must benet all involved parties is an axiomatic insight of economic theory,
and the same should be true for exchange between countries, international trade. But how are
these gains from trade split up between nations at diﬀerent stages of their economic development?
This section establishes the gains from opening to trade. This is done in a partial equilibrium
setting taking as given world prices. Global prices are derived in the next section. I focus on
relative eﬀects that occur to ’poor’ and ’rich’ countries. The structure of the present section is
the following. First, as a benchmark model, I establish the gains from trade that would prevail in
a world where education decisions are xed at autarky levels. This is equivalent to welfare eﬀects
in a standard Heckscher Ohlin model of trade with factors of production in xed supply. In this
static setting, a country gains from trade because it is diﬀerent from the rest of the world.
I show that the initial gains from trade are likely to lead to neutral gains from trade that favor
neither developed nor developing countries and leave the relative dispersion of income unchanged.
Dynamically, one has to distinguish between income divergence and divergence of welfare. I rst
describe the evolution of income. After opening markets, there is a phase of convergence of income
that reects the increased investment activity in richer countries and the decrease in education
in other countries. After a period of time  the increased investment in human capital translates
into again diverging income. I establish that the steady state of an open world is characterized by
larger diﬀerences in human capital abundance and also larger output diﬀerences than in a world
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of closed economies. I then turn to establish the evolution welfare. There are always additional
eﬃciency gains that occur to countries because the education decision can adjust to international
prices. However, because of the way in which trade aﬀects the surplus from education, there can
be dynamic divergence of welfare compared to the moment just after opening to trade. Finally,
I develop conditions for when trade leads to absolute divergence of welfare compared to autarky
and argue that these are likely to hold in reality.
Assume a small country  has a level of human capital eﬃciency of  and is in its autarky
stationary equilibrium. At point in time ∗, markets are unanticipatedly opened to trade with a








 .  will be endogenized in the next section. Instantaneously after opening




























Opening to trade has two eﬀects on income: it inuences both relative wage  and the unskilled
wage . These two eﬀects always work in opposite directions. If a country is more skill abundant
than the rest of the world ( 
  1), it benets from trade because the relative wage  increases,
but at the same time it looses from trade because the unskilled wage decreases. The opposite is
true for a country  that is less skill abundant than the rest of the world.
It is important to point out that net eﬀect always results in an increase of output. This can
formally be shown by evaluating the rst order condition of the ratio of (22) divided by (20) with
respect to . The minimum level of this ratio is equal to 1 and occurs at  = . A country
that happens to have autarky prices that are equal to the rest of the world is not aﬀected by
trade; all other countries strictly gain from trade.
Evaluating the second order condition of the above ratio establishes that countries that are
more diﬀerent from the rest of the world gain relatively more from trade. The intuition for this
result follows from standard trade theory. Each country faces a concave frontier of how much it
can supply of the two factors and because there are no market failures, the current supply is on
and not inside this frontier. Statically, factor supply is xed, but trade can change the relative
price. At any relative price, the input constraint of nal goods producers under trade passes
through the current factor supply (8), is tangent to the concave factor supply frontier and hence
encompasses the latter. Trade enables producers to a strictly larger set of input bundles, and
since production isoquants are convex, output increases.
A question of interest is whether at the moment of trade, it is poor or rich nations that benet
relatively more from liberalization. A statement on convergence or divergence involves comparing
income diﬀerences before and after opening to trade, i.e. four diﬀerent levels of income. To
establish the direction of relative gains from trade, I evaluate income diﬀerences for two small
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economies, a country form the north () and a country from the south (). I assume that the North
is skill abundant compared to the rest of the world, so that that  = (1 + ), where   0.
South is skill scarce and I assume that  = (1 + )
−1 .  and  are hence symmetrically
diﬀerent from the rest of the world. If for every pair of countries dened in this way there is
divergence of output, I speak about uniform relative divergence.
Denition 3 (Uniform relative Di- and Convergence) Let  and  be two small countries
with  = (1 + ) = (1 + )
2 . There is uniform relative divergence (convergence) of output
if trade results in an increase (decrease) of relative income diﬀerentials for every   0 and for
every .
At the moment, statements of convergence or divergence will be made for country pairs. If,
for all of possible such pairs, opening to trade diﬀerences in output and net present income are
increased, one can make statements of the world distribution of income.
The appealing feature of the denition at hand is that it helps to establish for which range
of world prices there will be divergence when opening to trade. The following lemma establishes
instantaneous eﬀects from trade.
Lemma 1 (Static Output Eﬀects of Trade) Consider the moment of opening to trade ∗.
There is uniform relative convergence (divergence) of output if the global size of the labor intensive
sector is smaller (bigger) than the human capital intensive one.








































It is also true that if 

1−
  1, the skill intensive sector is larger in terms of output and revenue
than the labor intensive sector.
If the skill intensive sector is large there is divergence, i.e. poor nations gain more from trade
if their sector of specialization is relatively unimportant. This result seems striking at rst sight,
but thinking in terms of wages oﬀers a good intuition. If 

1−
  1 the gains for unskilled labor
are relatively large because labor is a globally scarce factor. Poor countries that export labor
hence benet more from trade than do rich countries.
Mankiw et al. (1992) estimate that the global expenditure share of the human capital is about
as big as the one on pure labor services. A similar comparison can be made from the calculations
of Hall and Jones (1999): estimates suggest that the two sectors are of about the same size. Hence,
trade is in a static sense neither likely to favor poor nor rich nations and results in uniform gains
from trade.
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How is the path of income aﬀected after opening to trade? Throughout the following analysis,
I denote open economy expressions with an "" superscript. The new optimal cutoﬀ level for the







  + 
´
(23)
In the period from ∗ to ∗ + , any country  with 
  1 has a level of education investment
that is larger than in autarky. During this period of time, the increased rate of schooling decreases
the level of output in these countries: the supply of human capital is still xed at autarky levels
because skilled workers born before ∗ enter the labor market.
At the same time, an increased number of young workers chooses to get an education, leading
to a temporary decrease of  and consequently output. At point in time ∗, the rate of change


















Because the supply of skilled labor lags school enrollment rates by a period of time , (37) is
positive for a poor country with 
  1: in these economies, investment decreases instantaneously
at ∗, leading to a temporary ’overshooting’ of output14. Only after point in time ∗ +  does
the increased investment in human capital start to pay of as workers that started their schooling
at ∗ enter the skilled labor force. After this point in time, there is divergence of output. The



























For any country  with 
  1 the long term level of output is necessarily bigger than the one
prevailing at the moment of opening to trade. This reects the increased investment activity
compared to autarky. Similarly, the long term level of output under trade for any country  with

  1 is necessarily smaller than the one prevailing just after autarky. The following proposition
summarizes trade-induced changes of output after opening to trade.
Proposition 2 (Trade and the Dynamics of Income) Let  and  be two small countries
with  = (1 + ) = (1 + )
2 . There is uniform relative divergence of output comparing
the output just after opening to trade (22) to the one in the stationary equilibrium under free
trade (25). There is also uniform relative divergence of output comparing the output in autarky
stationary equilibrium (20) to the stationary equilibrium under free trade (25).
14Depending on the rate of death  and the time required for education  this eﬀect can be very pronounced,
and even lead to temporary reversals of income levels of rich and poor nations.
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Proof. see Appendix
The results of diverging output after opening to trade are straightforward. Trade increases
investment rates in rich countries while it decreases them in poor countries. Naturally, an open














Figure 1 displays the path of output for two countries  and  as they have been dened previ-
ously. The path of outcome displays initial convergence followed by more pronounced divergence.
What does the preceding analysis imply for welfare considerations? Because international capital
markets exist, at each moment of time, each household simply consumes a fraction  of its com-
plete net present value of future ows of income. Therefore, changes in welfare are equivalent to
changes in the net present value of income from all cohorts of income. The comparison is simple
for workers that have made their education decision before ∗. Since their education decision is
sunk, the increase of output due to trade is equivalent to the increase of net present income for
this group of workers.
For young workers, there are two questions of interest. The rst is whether they gain from
trade and the second is whether they gain more than they would have if the education choice had
not adjusted. First evaluate the net present value of income for cohorts of workers born at or
































Compare this to the level of net present income that the same cohort of workers get from adjusting
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(26) is the also net present value that a worker born just before ∗ gets.
Lemma 3 (Gains From Trade) For all  and any , there are gains from trade also when
the cutoﬀ remains at 

 . There are additional gains from trade when  adjusts optimally.





















With equality if  = 
What happens to relative levels? The following proposition establishes whether there is diver-
gence of net present income.
Proposition 4 (Post Opening Divergence) Let  and  be two small countries with  =
(1 + ) = (1 + )




























− − 1 + −

1−
  0 (28)

























If  = 0, this ratio equal 1. For any   0, this ratio can be shown to be bigger 1. The second
claim involves a similar comparison of (27) to (21). The equivalent ratio can shown to be bigger
1 for any   0 if (28) holds.
The preceding proposition establishes whether the net present income of young workers di-
verges when opening to trade. The household receives additional income from old cohorts of
workers that were born before ∗. To establish whether the total net present income of the
economy diverges, one has to evaluate the total relative increase in consumption, which is a
combination of contributions from generations born before ∗ and from younger cohorts born
thereafter. The total net present value of all future income of country  is given by two ows of






from old cohorts or workers ∗ + , the size
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of old cohorts stays constant at 1 but it decreases at rate  thereafter. In addition, starting from







. Consumption smoothing implies that the household consumes a fraction  of
its net wealth.





















When is consumption, and therefore also welfare, likely to diverge?
Proposition 5 (Trade and Divergence of Welfare) Let  and  be two small countries with
 = (1 + ) = (1 + )
2 . Opening to trade results in uniform divergence of welfare iﬀ
(1 − )− − 1 + (1 − )−

1−
  0 (30)
In autarky, households would consume (20). Again evaluating whether the gains from trade are
bigger for a skill abundant country  than for a skill scarce country , this is true for any   0
if (30) holds.
How likely are is trade to lead to divergence under realistic parameter values? Consider rst
the conditions for post opening divergence of net present income (28). If the duration of education
is suﬃciently short or  approaches 0, there is always divergence. This result is straightforward:
as − goes to 1, workers do not have to invest much in order to become skilled. Any human
capital accumulation that is induced by trade hence leads to large net gains for human capital
abundant countries. If − is is substantially below one, there is a signicant cost of education.
In this case, rich countries are likely to gain more from trade than poor nations if the global skill
intensive sector is large compared to the labor intensive sector and if the heterogeneity of workers
is small.
Why does worker heterogeneity have such an eﬀect on the impact of trade liberalization? The
same mechanism that controlled how diﬀerent countries are in autarky inuences how sensitive the
supply of skilled labor is to changes in the relative wage induced by trade. Consider a developed
country (  ). If workers are heterogeneous, for a given change in the wage only a moderate
number of additional workers enters the skilled sector. The increase in net income (i.e. in surplus)
is only moderate, as well. In contrast, if workers are homogenous, a small increase in the wage
induces a sizable entry in the skilled labor supply and consequently a larger increase in the surplus
from education.15
15An interesting benchmark is when all workers are identical. In this case trade induces complete specialization
and the gains from trade are the following. Workers in poor nations receive the global unskilled wage, while workers
in rich nations receive  / times the global unskilled wage. Because identical workers earn the unskilled wage,
the gains from trade are fundamentally diﬀerent and depend again only on wage and price eﬀects of trade. Due to
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The condition for total divergence of welfare is similar to the one for post opening divergence.
Diﬀerent countries are more likely to diverge if the time of schooling is short, the human capital
intensive sector is relatively important and if workers are more homogenous. In addition, the
elasticity of substitution now guides relative divergence. Since the skill supply reacts only slowly
to changed demand conditions, there is less likely to be divergence. It is again noteworthy that
empirical estimates of beta are small (see Autor et al. (1998)) so that conditions (28) and (30)
are similar.
6 General Equilibrium and The Skill Bias of Trade
The last part of the model evaluates the general equilibrium response of simultaneously opening
many countries to trade. The results of this section are related to a growing literature on the
skill bias of global trade. The increased exposure to international trade seems to have resulted
in both a pervasive increase in the skill premium while resulting in a decrease in the price of
skill intensive goods. One group of papers explaining such diversion, including Dinopolous and
Segerstrom (1999) and Gancia and Epifani (2005), argues that the skill intensive sector is more
sensitive to scale. Trade increases the market size for an average rm and hence leads to a relative
expansion of the skill intensive sector. A second class of models builds on the directed technical
change literature, with contributions by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Acemoglu (2003), and
Gancia (2004). Here, it is a combination of unequal protection of intellectual property rights and
diﬀerential factor endowments that creates technical change biased towards skilled workers. By
increasing the market size for skill complementary technologies in those countries that have good
intellectual property rights protection, trade increases the skill bias of global technology.
The current paper presents a new channel for why trade is skill biased and leads to a global
expansion of the skill intensive sector. The mechanism does not rely on how trade inuences tech-
nology, but on how trade inuences the international location of human capital. Trade equates
goods prices across the world, and the dynamic response of education decisions tends to concen-
trate human capital in countries that can use skills eﬃciently. With the average skilled worker
working in a country with a higher level of human capital augmenting technology, the output of
skill intensive goods increases. This results in a decrease of the price of skill intensive goods. The
expansion of the skill intensive sector takes place slowly as new cohorts enter the labor force.
Despite the decrease in the price of the skill intensive good, I show that an open economy
is skill biased. This is a consequence of two related mechanisms. At the moment of opening to
trade, the skill premium increases in human capital abundant countries, while it decreases in skill
scarce countries. The arithmetic average of the skill premium - weighted by relative supply -
hence increases with trade. Dynamically, there exists another eﬀect leading to further skill bias.
this, Lemma 1 (Static Gains From Trade) also describes conditions under which there is con- and divergence in the
case of homogenous workers.
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The supply of human capital decreases in countries that are skill scarce and increases elsewhere,
resulting in a further increase in the arithmetic average of the skill premium. The results of the
model in general equilibrium hence explain why a globalizing world is characterized by both a
decreasing price of the skill intensive good while at the same time resulting in a pervasive increase
in the skill premium.
I order all countries  by their relative human capital eﬀectiveness . I assume that this
measure is distributed with probability density function  (). This distribution might also
include large countries, and hence the following analysis also encompasses the typical two-country
North and South case. I assume that countries are not too diﬀerent, so that there exists no
country that would only have skilled workers in equilibrium.16 A global competitive equilibrium
follows the denition of equilibrium in a closed economy. The global resource constraint restricts

































Instantaneously after ∗, countries with   
 accumulate further human capital, while other
nations disaccumulate. In a stationary equilibrium, each country chooses a level of human capital
























Similarly to the denition of the average world level of human capital eﬃciency at the moment of
opening to trade 
, I denote the average long run global level of human capital eﬃciency in an











What is the diﬀerence between (33) and (35)? The key mechanism is that in autarky, the general
equilibrium response of prices dampens diﬀerences in the supply of human capital: a nation that is









characterized by a low  has a high price of the skill intensive good, thereby increasing demand.
In an open economy, all countries face the same price and across-country diﬀerences in the supply
of human capital are thus more pronounced. The next proposition establishes the net eﬀect of
this concentration of skills.
Proposition 6 (Expansion of the Skill Intensive Sector) The stationary equilibrium under
trade is characterized by a larger world production of skill intensive goods than in autarky.
Proof. The dynamic relative supply of skill intensive goods (34) is larger than the static one (32)














By Assumption 1   1 and due to this and the general means inequality, this is always true.
Trade, to a rst order, "shifts" skilled workers from low  to high  countries. While trade
also reduces skill abundance and the supply of the skill intensive good in some nations, it raises
the supply in exactly those countries that can use them very eﬃciently. This concentration results
in an expansion of the skill intensive sector.
A higher relative output implies a lower relative price of the skill intensive good, and one
might suspect that trade therefore lowers the average skill premium. Interestingly, the opposite
is the case.
In the context of the present model, skill bias is not easily established, since some countries
may see their skill premium increase with trade, but in other countries there may be a decrease
of the relative skilled wage. I therefore dene skill bias in an average sense.
Denition 4 (Pervasive Skill Bias) Trade is pervasively skill biased if the arithmetic average
of the relative wage of human capital increases with trade.
There are two questions of interest. First, is there pervasive skill bias at the moment of opening
to trade? Second, is there additional skill bias along the dynamic path of the global economy?
The following proposition answers both of these questions.
Proposition 7 (The Skill Bias of Trade) There is pervasive skill bias at ∗. The dynamic
response of educational investment results in further skill bias.
Proof. Compare the arithmetic average of the skill premium before, at the moment of and in the
































These two inequalities are satised by the general means inequality.
The same mechanism that is responsible for the output increase of the skill intensive sector is
responsible for the skill bias of trade. Consider rst the moment of opening to trade. When goods
prices are equalized, the wage increases in skill abundant countries, while it decreases in skill
scarce countries. Since all countries have an equal endowment of unskilled labor, this channel is
not present for unskilled sector. Additionally, the dynamic response of human capital amplies the
initial skill bias. Trade induces skill accumulation in high wage countries and de accumulation
elsewhere. The arithmetic average of the wage hence increases further. This result is related
to Dinopolous and Segerstrom (1999) and especially to Gancia and Epifani (2005): while these
authors argue that the skill intensive sector is more sensitive to scale, here it is the fact that the
factor used intensively in one industry can be accumulated and this, on the aggregate, leads to
the industry to having a higher growth potential.
What is the path of globalization when many nations simultaneously open their markets to
trade? This section establishes the path of global development. The main insights are very
similar to that of Section 5 evaluated at 
 (see Equation (35)). Also, there may exist a group
of intermediately developed countries that starts the process of globalization as exporters of the
skill intensive good and successively become importers of the latter. This results stems from
the expansion of the skill intensive sector and the resulting decline of skill intensive goods prices
caused by trade.
At the moment of opening to trade, world prices are given by static world supply (32). Lemma
1 (Static Output Eﬀects of Trade) describes the evolution of the world income distribution at the
moment of trade, which converges if at the moment of opening to trade, the size of the world skill
intensive sector is larger than that of the unskilled sector. The long run distribution of income
is given by Proposition 2 (Trade and the Dynamics of Income) and the long term level of world
average technology (
), which is pinned down by (35). That is, there is long term divergence of
the world distribution of income around 
.
What happens to investment and the path of income after ∗? Each household in each country
considers the same evolution of goods prices and the education decision leads to an optimal cutoﬀ














Because all countries evaluate the same evolution of prices, it is easy to make relative statements
about the cutoﬀ level . Dene the level of technology for which the dynamic path of wages
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(36) evaluated at  ≥ ∗ leads to exactly the same cutoﬀ level as in autarky by 
 . Comparing






After opening markets to trade, all countries with   
 decrease their educational investment
while others increase their level of investment. There is thus instantaneous convergence of income
around 
. How does the distribution of world income evolve thereafter? First evaluate the
evolution of relative output for countries that are more technologically advanced than the rest of
the world in long term equilibrium 
. At any point in time   ∗ these countries invest more
in skills than in autarky. Thus, again the GDP of these countries initially decreases until period
∗+ and then increases. The opposite is true for all countries with   
∗. Along any point
in time   ∗ these countries invest less in skills than in autarky. The dynamics for the countries
with 
∗    
 are more interesting. This group starts the process of globalization being
an exporter of the skill intensive good but successively becomes an importer of the latter. That
is, as 
 converges to 
, a larger and larger fraction has lower investment in education than
in autarky.
What are the welfare consequences of globalizing markets? Consider rst countries that do
not change their pattern of specialization i.e. all 
∗    
. Proposition 5 (Trade and the
Divergence of Welfare) establishes conditions under which welfare diverges for a given constant
level of world prices. In fact, the world price of skill intensive goods is higher than in the long
run equilibrium with 
. This creates additional temporary gains for exporters of skill intensive
goods: if (30) holds for  = 
, there is divergence around 
. In fact, divergence is more likely
than if prices would instantaneously jump to their long term levels. Consider now this group of
countries that has 
∗    
. Some of these countries might experience smaller dynamic
than static gains from trade. For example consider — if it exists — a country with  = 
. This
country starts as an exporter of the skill intensive sector but does not trade in the long run. By
Lemma 1 (Static Gains From Trade), this nations gains statically from trade, but it does not gain
from trade in the long run. Putting things together, globalization results in long term divergence
of income around 
, the long term average level of technology.
7 Conclusion
Recent contributions to the literature of economic growth have argued that factor accumulation
is a key ingredient for long term economic success. Countries that have sustained high rates of
growth did so because of their high levels of savings and investment in human capital (see Young
(1995) and Mankiw et al. (1992)). Other nations stagnated precisely because their institutional
setups hindered private savings and investment (see for example Hall and Jones (1999)).
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To evaluate whether trade has sizeable and rst order eﬀects on economic performance, it is
therefore essential to show how exposure to international prices inuences factor accumulation.
Indeed, one of the most fundamental insights of the theory of international trade is Samuelson’s
(1948) factor price equalization theorem suggest that when some factors, such as physical and
human capital, are in variable supply, trade thereby re-enforces initial patters of specialization.
However, being a net supplier of human capital that can be accumulated increases the growth
potential of the economy, while specialization in labor intensive sectors means specialization in
a factor in xed supply. In addition to showing how trade can result in divergence of income, I
evaluate how trade aﬀects relative welfare diﬀerentials. The dynamic response of the economy
that introduces the asymmetry between nations in the model. This result stems from the two
margins in which the relative wage inuences the surplus from education: a higher relative wage
increases the income for all workers that already would have chosen schooling at lower wages.
In addition, an increase in the relative wage induces more entry into the skilled labor force. In
total, the surplus from education responds more than proportionally to changes in the relative
wage. Skill scarce nations, in contrast, have their comparative advantage in a factor that is in
xed supply and cannot be accumulated.
The key insight of the mechanism at work is that while all countries gain from trade, it is
already developed nations that gain proportionally the most from trade. Trade hence might result
in dynamic divergence of welfare.
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8 Appendix A
Proof. Of Lemma 1 (Static Output Eﬀects of Trade)
Evaluate autarky output (20) to output at ∗ (22) for two countries  = (1 + ) =
(1 + )















































































































































































 = log() so (37) is equal to 0. In addition, (37) takes
the value 0 if  → ∞ and if  = 0. Evaluating the slope of (37) with respect to x, it can be shown
that at levels of  just below 1,(37) is decreasing, implying that (37) is bigger 0 for any 1    0.
In addition, it can be shown there exist at most 3 levels of x where (37) equals 0. Hence, (??) is
increasing in  whenever 1    0.
Proof. of Proposition 2 (Trade and The Dynamics of Income)
To establish the two claims of the proposition, compare the relative ratio of output for two
countries N and S in autarky (20), just after opening to trade (22) and in the stationary equilibrium


























First note that if  = 0, this ratio is equal to 1. Now evaluate the rst and second derivative of
(38) with respect to . The rst derivative is positive at  = 0, while the second derivative is
positive for any . Hence, for any   0 (38) takes a value larger than 1. A proof along the same





























9 Appendix B: Endogenous Technology
The previous results have been derived under the assumption of exogenous technology diﬀerences.
This section endogenizes technology in a two sector model of endogenous growth. It is established
that all results are amplied.
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Assume that the production of intermediate goods is modied alla Romer (1990) in the two
sector version of Acemoglu (1998). Technology is local and in each country, the production
function combines factor specic diﬀerentiated input goods and the respective factor. Each of
these input goods is produced using a linear transformation of the respective intermediate good17.
I denote the amount of each input good used in the labor intensive sector by  and the one used
for production of the skill intensive good by . The net output of each intermediated (denoted


























 −  (A2)
(1    1) Where  and  are the ows of R&D expenditures that are used to invent
new blueprints in each sector.18 I assume that innovation in sector j uses only the respective
intermediate good as input to produce new innovations. Furthermore, as in Jones(1995) , inno-
vation becomes more diﬃcult as the current level of innovation is higher. Denoting the ow-cost
of innovation in terms of the respective intermediate goods in sector  and country  by (),




with   0, innovation in each country essentially runs into decreasing returns. I now char-
acterize countries not by their intrinsic diﬀerence in technology, but by their diﬀerence in their
educational sector. That is, some countries are essentially better at educating their workforce.
The demographic structure is essentially unchanged, except that in country , a skilled worker of
type  now supplies  units of skilled labor if she chooses to get educated.  is the country
specic eﬃciency of the educational system that is given exogenously. Models of endogenous
investments in technology that are nanced with prots from monopolistic competition features
two related market failures: because each input good monopolist cannot prices discriminate, it
charges a constant markup prices hence producing a suboptimal amount. For given levels of
technology, the production of a country is thus suboptimal. More importantly, the same lack
of ability to price discriminate also leads to the monopolist not capturing the full social surplus
from her invention. There is thus also suboptimal entry into the input producing sector, with
important dynamic consequences for technology, output and welfare. Because innovators face a
17To be sure: there are now two sorts of input goods used two produce two intermediate goods used to produce
the nal good.
18Epifani and Gancia show in one section how trade can lead to skill bias when the elasticity of substitution
(1 − )
−1 between varieties is larger in the skill intensive sector that nin the labor intensive one.
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constant demand elasticity, they charge a price of 1 times their marginal costs. Each innovator
in the L sector hence sells  = 2 units while a rm in the H sector sells  = 2. Free










The net output in each sector is hence given by
e  =
¡




















 −  (A2)















Because relative technology is increasing in factor abundance, the relative wage may now be
increasing in the supply of skilled labor. The steady state education supply in each country is a
















 matters more than proportional, because it inuences both the cutoﬀ and the average level












An non explosive equilibrium closed economy requires that 
1+
  1, and the condition

1+
  1 is required for a non-explosive open equilibrium. Otherwise, the result of the model
with endogenous education and an intrinsic diﬀerence in the eﬃciency in the educational system
is equivalent to the model with xed technology, except that because also technology adjusts,
countries tend to be more dissimilar.
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Table 1 - The Skill Intensity of Imports (all Bilateral non-zero Trade Flows in 1992) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent Variable:  Relative Skilled Labor Content of Imports measured by  
(1)-(3): Workers with High School Equivalent / all Labor 
(4)-(6): Workers with at Least Some Secondary Education / all 
Labor 
        
Foreign Skill Supply I  0.051  0.047 
[0.005]***  [0.005]*** 
Home Skill Supply I  -0.036  -0.031 
[0.006]***  [0.005]*** 
Foreign Skill Supply II  0.116  0.109 
[0.009]***  [0.009]*** 
Home Skill Supply II  -0.071  -0.058 
[0.014]***  [0.013]*** 
                    
Observations  3055 3055 3055 3055  3055  3055





Table 2 - Gravity Estimation of the Factor Content of Bilateral Imports (Poisson Estimates) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent Variable: Import Factor Content of Bileratal Imports for the Following Factor: 
Workers w. Finished High School or Equivalent  w. sec. Schooling  w Tert. Schooling  Capital  Land 
Year Analyzed: 1992  1992 1972 1992 (1992) 1992  1992 1992
              
Fraction of Workers  3.251 
w. high School in For  [0.309]*** 
Ln Foreign Supply of   0.76 0.754
Workers w. High School  [0.042]*** [0.037]***
Ln Foreign Supply of   0.782 
Workers w sec. Schooling  [0.053]***
Ln Foreign Supply of   0.733 
Workers w. tert. Schooling  [0.042]*** 
Ln Foreign Supply of   0.828
Capital  [0.045]*** 
Ln Foreign Supply of   0.428 
Land  [0.068]***
Ln Population Foreign  0.599 
[0.053]*** 
Ln Population Home  -1.15  -1.121 -1.176 -1.058 -1.099 -1.115  -1.048 -1.295
[0.055]***  [0.057]***  [0.060]***  [0.045]***  [0.062]***  [0.054]***  [0.046]***  [0.069]*** 
Log Distance  0.66  0.655  0.665  0.663  0.651  0.649  0.682  0.723 
[0.058]***  [0.059]*** [0.068]*** [0.054]*** [0.063]*** [0.056]***  [0.057]*** [0.059]***
Exporter Fixed Effects  y
              






Table 3 - Geographic Proximity to Skills and Domestic Education (RE or FE Panel Regressions Spanning 5 5-Year Intervals from 
72-92)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Raw Panel   Adding Geog.  Adding Controls  Adding Fixed  FE & time varying  Lagged Prox-  5 Year Changes 
Correlation  Openess for Institutions Effects (FE) Geog. Openess  -imity to Skills  on Changes
Dependent Variable:  (1)-(6): Ln Avg. Years of Education in the Workforce 
                       
Geog. Proximity  -0.08  -0.10  -0.11  -0.10  -0.12 
to Skilled Workers  [0.024]***  [0.024]*** [0.037]*** [0.024]*** [0.024]***
Lag 1 of Proximity  -0.07 
to Skilled Workers  [0.030]** 
Ch. of Proximity to  -0.10 
Skilled Workers  [0.032]***
Frankel Romer   0.01 
Geog. Openess  [0.004]*** 
Dollar & Kray  0.191  0.104 
Geog. Openess  [0.063]***  [0.065] 
Ch.  Dollar & Kray  0.126 
Geog. Openess  [0.066]* 
Settler Mortality  -0.241 
[0.099]** 
 Trend   0.13  0.14  0.13  0.14  0.10  0.11  -0.01 
[0.007]***  [0.006]***  [0.008]***  [0.006]***  [0.014]***  [0.016]***  [0.008] 
 Legal Org. dummies   y 
 Country Fixed Effects   y  y  y 
                       
Groups  204  204  159  204  204  164  163 






Table 4 - The Effect of Trade on Differnt Types of Education (FE Panel Regressions) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Response of Primary vs. Higher  Response of Primary vs. Higher  Response to  
Education to Skilled Labor Import  Education to Unskilled Labor  Highly Skilled Labor 













           
Geog. Proximity  -0.10  -0.15 
to Skilled Workers  [0.024]***  [0.048]***
Geog. Proximity to  0.07  0.18 
Unskilled Workers  [0.036]** [0.068]***
Geog. Proximity to  -0.088  -0.119 
Highly Skilled Workers  [0.022]***  [0.043]*** 
Dollar & Kray  0.16  0.10  0.10  0.00  0.15  0.09 
Geog. Openess  [0.064]**  [0.126]  [0.066]  [0.126]  [0.064]**  [0.127] 
Trend  0.08  0.22  0.08  0.23  0.08  0.22 
[0.014]***  [0.028]***  [0.015]***  [0.029]***  [0.014]***  [0.028]*** 
 Country Fixed Effects   y  y  y  y  y  y 
                    
Groups  204  204  204  204  204  204 
Observations  41  41  41  41  41  41 





COUNTRY CODE Actl FCT HK1/POP Pred. FCT HK1/POP Actual FCT HK2/POP Pred. FCT HK2/POP
Argentina ARG 0.0033684 0.0013843 0.0076796 0.0019838
Australia AUS 0.0156595 0.0012524 0.0353459 0.0015204
Austria AUT 0.050929 0.0079536 0.1049795 0.0102248
Belgium BEL 0.0995534 0.0242058 0.2002868 0.0319474
Bangladesh BGD 0.0001472 0.0006098 0.0002498 0.0005991
Bolivia BOL 0.0013662 0.0021585 0.0029329 0.0025738
Brazil BRA 0.000902 0.0008657 0.0020244 0.0008593
Canada CAN 0.0340874 0.0126008 0.0768641 0.0038954
Chile CHL 0.0048128 0.0014096 0.0107315 0.0014921
Cameroon CMR 0.0005447 0.0013528 0.0011327 0.0013688
Colombia COL 0.001603 0.0017553 0.0035777 0.0013072
Costa Rica CRI 0.0062644 0.0044054 0.0112671 0.003127
Germany DEU 0.0371908 0.0078331 0.0737739 0.0086087
Dominican Republi DOM 0.0045665 0.003405 0.0070124 0.0020678
Ecuador ECU 0.0018717 0.0026027 0.0043515 0.0027665
Egypt EGY 0.0011397 0.0018414 0.0022832 0.0026529
Spain ESP 0.0189396 0.0034027 0.0393566 0.0041596
Ethiopia ETH 0.0001348 0.0007075 0.0002709 0.0007102
Finland FIN 0.0280207 0.0080966 0.0606272 0.010228
France FRA 0.0338046 0.009455 0.0704005 0.0108103
UK GBR 0.0299144 0.008869 0.0627145 0.010267
Ghana GHA 0.0004863 0.0013363 0.0010198 0.0012835
Greece GRC 0.0156624 0.0036018 0.0312232 0.004544
Guatemala GTM 0.0018572 0.0038483 0.0035795 0.0024711
Honduras HND 0.0018829 0.0052114 0.0032362 0.005305
India IND 0.0001068 0.0005961 0.0002446 0.0008205
Ireland IRL 0.051388 0.0105353 0.1065766 0.0140363
Iceland ISL 0.0439459 0.0118418 0.0901199 0.0150537
Israel ISR 0.0212666 0.0031558 0.047085 0.0046584
Italy ITA 0.0230816 0.0040044 0.0474788 0.0052702
Jamaica JAM 0.005729 0.0080753 0.0099525 0.0042925
Japan JPN 0.0109529 0.0020878 0.0206181 0.0019955
Korea, Rep. KOR 0.0106769 0.0026641 0.0241156 0.0020616
Sri Lanka LKA 0.0010173 0.0009491 0.001901 0.0009943
Morocco MAR 0.0019483 0.0027749 0.0038536 0.0037612
Madagascar MDG 0.0001902 0.0007833 0.00041 0.000801
Mexico MEX 0.0053249 0.0031339 0.0115914 0.0013737
Malawi MWI 0.0001881 0.0009287 0.000401 0.0009002
Malaysia MYS 0.0108268 0.0012462 0.0263758 0.0014133
Nigeria NGA 0.0004729 0.0008495 0.0010941 0.000735
Netherlands NLD 0.0735976 0.0164973 0.147273 0.0210376
Norway NOR 0.0476122 0.0098605 0.1006144 0.0124308
New Zealand NZL 0.0170064 0.001469 0.038523 0.0013423
Pakistan PAK 0.0003959 0.003445 0.0008485 0.0051765
Panama PAN 0.0385122 0.0055632 0.0857173 0.0059807
Peru PER 0.0009234 0.0013595 0.0018967 0.001142
Philippines PHL 0.0012117 0.0014731 0.0026486 0.0017009
Papua New Guinea PNG 0.0017484 0.001458 0.0037988 0.0010718
Portugal PRT 0.0258084 0.0062916 0.0508878 0.0090776
El Salvador SLV 0.0019679 0.0051129 0.0039094 0.0037858
Suriname SUR 0.0059145 0.0047717 0.0126213 0.0047342
Sweden SWE 0.0411911 0.0076858 0.0865051 0.0099012
Syrian SYR 0.0010638 0.0013792 0.0022904 0.0019241
Thailand THA 0.0045238 0.0026697 0.0105152 0.0037086
Tunisia TUN 0.0059709 0.004736 0.0111689 0.006899
Turkey TUR 0.002042 0.0019111 0.004691 0.002062
Tanzania TZA 0.0002024 0.000708 0.0004511 0.0006767
Uruguay URY 0.0051781 0.0057908 0.0110467 0.0093274
US USA 0.0148143 0.0016287 0.0313321 0.0016086
Venezuela, VEN 0.0044967 0.0022322 0.0101182 0.0018017
South Africa ZAF 0.0026293 0.0005744 0.005827 0.0005227
Zambia ZMB 0.0004482 0.0007637 0.0008866 0.0007648
Zimbabwe ZWE 0.0006618 0.0010386 0.0013359 0.0010024
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